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USE OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
By HuE H. BRoAnnURST*
A recent decision calls attention to Kentucky's policy re-
garding the admissibility of competent evidence that has been
procured by illegal search and seizure. The trial court admit-
ted evidence that had been procured by means of a void search
warrant and the upper courtl remanded the case with instruc-
tions to discard all evidence procured in an illegal manner.
There can only be two policies with reference to this type
of evidence, one is to admit all competent evidence regardless of
the manner of its procurement, and the other is to accept none
that has been procured in an unlawful manner; competency
has no weight in the latter policy. There are slight variations
of policy within the respective groups but, in the main, holdings
are consistent.
The group favoring admission includes England, Canada,
and a majority of the States. We find Wigmore,2 Greenleaf 3
and Jones 4 in this group.
The English position is that the unlawfulness of procure-
ment cannot possibly affect the probative value of the evidence,
it must be competent and pertinent; cases so holding are on
record as far back as 17235 (later cases affirm this position).
The court remarked in a case6 where the police had secured doc-
uments without authority and offered them in evidence, that
no inquiry would be permitted into the methods used by the
police in securing the documents.
Georgia records a well considered opinion 7 in which it is
*War Department, Washington, D. C.; graduate of West Point,
1905; Lieut. Col. U. S. Army; member staff of Kentucky Law Journal,
1930-32; LL. B., College of Law, University of Kentucky, 1932.
"Divine v. Commonwealth, 33 S. W. (2) 627 (1930).
2 Wigmore on Evidence, 4th Vol., Sec. 2183.
$Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 254 (a).
Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, 2d- Edition, Se. 2076.
'Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 Howard State Trials, 495 and 629.
$Regina v. Granatelli, 7 State Trials, N. S. 979 (1849).
'Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28- S. E. 624 (1897).
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asserted that the restriction imposed by the Constitution upon
illegal search and seizure applies only to legislative efforts to
legalize the intrusion of officers acting beyond the scope of their
authority, and to placing upon courts the duty of denouncing
such legislative efforts. Individuals claiming to act in the name
of the State are acting for themselves alone, but the act does
not affect the admissibility of the evidence if competent.
This Georgia case expresses regret that the evidence was ob-
tained by the officer without any authority whatsoever, a very
unreasonable act to be sure, but such acts cannot be allowed to
determine the admissibility of the evidence obtained. A further
naive expression holds that since Georgia has no law that ren-
ders inadmissible in evidence the fruits of an illegal search and
seizure courts should not be over sensitive with regard to the
manner of procurement of evidence so long as it is pertinent,
and does not in its self violate constitutional rights, such admis-
sion violates no principle of public policy.
Massachusetts' policy is similar,8 and the opinion in the
case has even been quoted with approval by the U. S. Supreme
Court.9 Research discloses that an Illinois' ° court holds it
illogical to claim that any manner or amount of illegality of
procurement can change the character of evidence; the situation
is compared to the case where the presence of the witness has
been secured by fraud or violence. The fraud or the violence
may be punished severely, but the evidence given by the wit-
ness is not to be refused on that account alone, if it be pertinent
and competent it should be admitted.
The U. S. Constitution provides for the "right of the
people to be secure in their houses, papers, persons and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and "that no per-
son shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, etc." These words appear in the constitutions
of many of our states, but eminent authorities have construed
them as binding only upon Federal officers, if others exceed the
scope of their authority they do not act in the name of their
soveriegn power but on their individual account, and the U. S.
courts are at liberty to use the fruits of the labors of state
officers when they gather illegally procured evidence.
8 Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metcalf (Mass.) 329 (1841).
'Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
20 Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513.
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California1 considers the unlawful procurement of evi-
dence as the detached act of a wrongdoer which he may turn to
his own benefit, destroy, or return to the owner; or offer the
evidence against the owner at a subsequent trial. The unlawful
act is completed when the evidence is removed from the owner's
control, its subsequent detention and use as evidence are not
parts of the same transaction.
Redress for the invasion of one's constitutional rights is
not in the exclusion of competent evidence illegally procured,
about all the redress possible is the right to maintain an action
against the offending officer; if any violation of constitutional
rights occurred at all it was at the time of the unlawful search
and seizure, and not when the evidence was offered in court.
The U. S. Supreme Court held in 190412 that illegally pro-
cured evidence may be admitted, the decision quotes, with ap-
proval, the stand taken by Greenleaf; and squarely asserts that
the reception in evidence of unlawfully acquired material is not
a violation of any rights guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution.
The attitude appears to be to regard the manner of procurement
as a mere incident, its unlawfulness is simply ignored if not
exactly condoned; and time will be wasted in an effort to test
its admissibility on such trifling grounds.
As for the possibility of self incrimination, those, who sup-
port the admission of unlawfully acquired evidence, virtually
claim that the fruits of illegal searches and seizures, intrusions
upon privacy without legal warrant, etc., are not forced ad-
missiois against interest, nor self incriminations in violation of
the 5th Amendment. They are facts, or sets of facts or objects,
which the accused has failed to conceal, destroy, or otherwise
nullify, and which may be looked upon as witnesses against him.
If these witnesses can be presented before the court, whether
by force, by fraud, or other unlawful means, and there testify
against the accused the evidence is obtained from the articles
and not from the accused-hence no self incrimination. Self
incrimination relates solely to testimony given by the accused
and not to the acts of others or to inferences drawn from the,
mute witnesses discovered by illegal procedure.
Mr. Jeremy Bentham, the eminent English writer on legal
UPeople v. Mayen, 205 Pac. 435 (1922).
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
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subjects, said in his "Rationale of Judicial Proceedure", Vol.
8, page 452, "You are sure of being convicted, by what sort of
evidence would you choose to be convicted? By the evidence of
other people without your own, or by the evidence of other peo-
ple and your own together?" Little hope exists for the accused
by either course it seems.
It is not denied that the number of jurisdictions whi6h
refuse to receive illegally procured evidence is less than the
number that accept it, yet their standing is of the best and their
position is strongly entrenched with sound reasoning.
With occasional variations the Federal courts hold that un-
lawfully procured evidence is inadmissible. Beginning with
Boyd v. U. S.13 in 1885 it was held that the use of documents
procured unlawfully would be the same as compelling the wit-
ness to testify against himself, many cases' 4 can be cited affirm-
ing this position. Significant words are found in Weeks v.
U. 8.15 which was decided in 1914, in which the court remarked
that "the tendency of those who execute the laws to obtain con-
viction by means of unlawful seizures that are destructive of
rights secured by the Constitution, should find no sanction in
the judgment of our courts." If illegally seized evidence may
be used then the protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no
value and might just as well be stricken from the Constitution
and the fundamental law of the land be sacrificed. In 1919 the
case of Laughter v. U. 8.16 published the policy that even though
a person may be searched after a lawful arrest it is still neces-
sary to have a special search warrant to search his pockets for
documents that are to be used against him in a subsequent trial.
Perhaps this case has a perfect title when compared to its de-
tails. There was a case in 192217 that regarded the use of
evidence obtained by means of a void search warrant as self
incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
It is appropriate at this point to note that courts of chan-
cery are not prone to issue decrees of discovery that may lead
to the conviction of crime or the forfeiture of one's property.
"Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 618.
" U. S. v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338; Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245; Flagg
v. U. S., 233 Fed. 481; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385;
Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298.
5Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383.
"Laughter v. U. S., 259 Fed. 94.
" Woods v. U. S., 279 Fed. 706.
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Where state officials secured evidence illegally and turned
it over to Federal authorities who thereafter used it on the
ground that no federal officer had been concerned in its pro-
curement the dissenting opinion is rather scathing.' s It held
that respect for the law will not be advanced by such proced-
ure, because it shocks the common man's sense of decency and
fair play, that government officials have no right to conduct
themselves contrary to the manner prescribed for other citi-
zens; that the action of the official is not necessarily lawful
because it does not violate constitutional provisions, or because
the same result might have been procured by other and entirely
proper means.
Cooley indicates in his "Constitutional Limitations", page
374, that a search warrant can be used only to discover the sub-
ject of a crime that is concealed where the public or the com-
plainant has an interest in it, or in its destruction. He asserts
that citizens should not have their homes invaded, their desks
broken open, their private papers, books, letters, etc., exposed
to the prying eyes of persons not gifted with a proper under-
standing of the rights and feelings of others; that it is better
to let the guilty escape than subject a citizen to such indignities
without proper legal authority.
The following language is found in a Kentucky case:19
"Must courts close their eyes to the fact that receiving unlaw-
fully procured evidence amounts to telling officers that they
may break open houses, rifle desks, etc, without warrant, and
that the evidence, if competent will be admitted? Such methods
will break down respect for the law and create the impression
that court officials may violate the law with impunity. It is
much better that the guilty person escape conviction than that
a court of justice put aside a fundamental principle of law."
Mr. Justice Holmes of the U. S. Supreme Court feels the same
way about illegally procured evidence when he says in the wire-
tapping case20 that the guilty should escape if the government
must play an ignoble port to secure conviction.
A Aichigan court 21 says that the unlawful search and sei-
zure is an unauthorized trespass, an invasion of the accused's
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465.
"Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152; 224 S. W. 860.
"Olmsted v. U. S., 277 U. S. 438.
l People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557.
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constitutional rights which are sacred, and any attempt to frit-
ter them away, no matter how beneficial to the people it is
claimed to be, must meet with the clear and earnest disapproval
of the courts.
Is there any middle policy that will escape the pitfalls?
Any hard and fast policy is prone to do injustice or defeat jua-
tice altogether, the smart criminal may escape on technicalities
if evidence be refused that has been procured unlawfully; or
an innocent person may be punished unjustly, but legally, if he
resists the unlawful procurement of evidence. To attempt a
course between these two will produce difficulties, the personal
equation of one enforcement officer is different from that of all
other enforcement officers; some use good judgment, some use
bad, and some use none.
When the urge to hunt out wrongdoers is strong, as in war
time or in prohibition enforcement, much is overlooked when
the slacker, draft evader, law violator, etc., are brought to an
accounting. Mere illegalities are condoned and perhaps encour-
aged.
Emotions are prone to warp judgments in time of stress,
unconsciously it is hoped, yet the degree is noticeable. Men
think that the end justifies the means. Call it maudlin senti-
ment where a criminal is allowed to escape on the plea that his
home was desecrated, entered unlawfully, and damning evi-
dence found, which, by a mere technicality, could not be used to
convict him of the crime that he was undoubtedly guilty of.
But if the rule be hard and fast the innocent person must suffer
the same desecration of his home, and what atonement is pos-
sible when nothing is found to incriminate him? Just an action
against the officer guilty of the trespass.
The effect upon the guilty and innocent will be the same
under the humiliation of having one's private affairs exposed
to curious and unfeeling persons, perhaps selected for their hard-
ness of nature and physical strength, and too ignorant to ap-
preciate what their eyes see-men who parade under an ill fit-
ting cloak of authority. To be compelled to submit to what-
ever use such persons may choose to make of what they discover
is bound to initiate a feeling that laws were made to break, and
where one's temper is fragile, the chances are that its fragments
may be spread upon the law's representative as an expression
of disrespect for his profession.
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Suppose the police arrest an innocent person loitering in
front of a restaurant and search him without a warrant, they
find pawn tickets which later investigation reveals that valu-
able jewelry has been pawned. While still in jail the man's
home is invaded unlawfully, desks are ripped open and his pri-
vate papers outraged in a search for incriminating evidence,
and nothing is found. The case is simply one of a fellow down
on his luck, out of work, hungry, and forced to pawn family
heirlooms for food. Much harm has been done, and he has no
redress except the right to maintain an action against the
police. This right is a doubtful benefit in most cases.
Consider the case of the hardened criminal who has suc-
ceeded in robbing a bank, he places the money in a handbag and
after eluding pursuit registers at a hotel under an assumed
name. Unfortunately for the criminal, the name assumed is the
name of a real person that the police have traced to the hotel
and who is wanted for breaking a pool room window and carry-
ing off a few billiard balls as a prank. The police enter the
room and accuse the bank robber of breaking the window and
carrying away the billiard balls, the robber wants to pay for
everything; but the police decide to search the hand bag for the
billiard balls; the stolen bank notes are found and quickly iden-
tified as belonging to the bank, and the suspected billiard ball
thief is arrested for robbing the bank. How many of us will
waste any sympathy if the court rules that the police might
have exceeded their authority in searching the hand bag but
that the evidence obtained thereby was both competent and ad-
missible. The crime of bank robbery was a completed act
and the presence of the stolen money accomplished the convic-
tion of the criminal that stole it. The money was a silent
witness which the police unlawfully procured to testify at a
subsequent trial. What rights of the robber were invaded when
the money was used as evidence to convict him of the bank rob-
bery ?
There is the case 22 of the husband whose wife had con-
cealed the fact of her infidelity from him until he surrepti-
tiously obtained her diary which contained entries establishing
her illicit relations. The court accepted the evidence as admis-
sible and competent.
2 Ware v. State (Wisc.), 230 N. W. 80.
K. L. J.-7
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That eminent jurist, Justice Holmes, appears to oppose the
admissibility of unlawfully procured evidence. In one of his
opinions he is quoted as saying that he deemed it a less evil to
let some criminals escape than that the Government should play
an ignoble part. (Tapping private telephone wires by govern-
ment agents in bootlegging cases.) 23 This view was recently ad-
hered to (according to the newspapers) in an entrapment case
where a federal agent enticed the accused to procure and sell to
the agent a small quantity of whiskey.
Among the advantages of permitting the use of illegally
procured evidence we might list the following:
(a) Criminals would be deprived of technical prohibitions.
(b) Court procedure would be freed from the petty delay of determ-
ing the collateral issue of admissibility.
Its disadvantages might include:
(a) Giving officers of the law an opportunity to abuse their authority
under the pretense of performing their duty.
(b) Building up a disrespect for law and order among those who nor-
mally respect the law.
(c) Destruction of confidence in law enforcement officers and the cre-
ation of suspicion that the courts encourage unfair practices.
By declining to admit competent evidence that was pro-
cured illegally the following advantages may be reviewed:
(a) Convictions will depend entirely upon evidence obtained in a legal
manner.
(b) The determination of guilt or innocence will have no connection
with the personal wrong doing of procuring officers.
The disadvantages of such policies will certainly produce
the following conditions:
(a) Give guilty persons greater opportunities to outwit justice.
(b) Reduce the zeal and ingenuity of enforcement officers In securing
competent evidence.
(c) Delays found necessary to decide the issue of admissibility will
clog court dockets in an undetermined manner.
It is apparent that items of strength in one group appear
as weaknesses in the other groups, the ideal solution should have
all the advantages and none of the disadvantages, but how can
it be obtained? If it were a simple problem in mathematics we
could subtract the total of the disadvantages from the total of
the advantages and the result might possibly be a surplus of
'Olmsted v. U. S., 277 U. S. 438 (1925).
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advantages-but these items are not similar quantities and
mathematical principles do not apply, one cannot subtract
lemons from oranges.
The actual problem is whether the difficulty of enforcing
laws justifies the means necessary to secure evidence that con-
victs violators, or should the laws be changed. Or shall we
forego the use of such means where there is a possibility that
innocent persons may suffer? There is another consideration-
Is it proper, lawful or justifiable to let the guilty escape? Is
there a limit to the number that we must allow to escape and
what is the limit? Innocent persons do not ordinarily find
themselves in situations that require their innocence to be vin-
dicated by permitting the guilty to escape, their punishment is
generally due to the acts perpetrated against them by officers in
excess of their logical and legal authority. Those very rare in-
stances where discovery of innocence did not precede the pun-
ishment administered should not be permitted to encourage any
hope among the guilty that puntitive measures will be relaxed
at any time. It seems beyond all reason to forget an incident
that shows up the guilt of the wrong-doer; of course, they do
not relish discovery, but why forget it when the fact has been
accomplished ?
Can we leave the matter to the discretion of some agency
that will be authorized to admit illegally procured evidence in
some cases and refuse it in others? This will only serve to set
up another court of limited jurisdiction, we have enough courts
now.
The writer is unable to appreciate just why pity should be
wasted on a guilty person who has been convicted by pertinent
and competent evidence, its admissibility is of very minor im-
portance. Presuming that the consciousness of his own guilt
has not served to humiliate him, there is little chance that so-
ciety in general will suffer much from a policy that permits
the introduction of silent witnesses which proclaim his guilt.
His humiliation will be well deserved and he should not be per-
mitted to escape the consequences of transgressing the rules of
civilized communities. It should be only necessary to show that
a transgression was accomplished by the accused, the manner
of acquiring the proof should not stay the strong arm of the
law in any particular.
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It is suggested that appropriate legislation provide severe
punishment for all law enforcement officers who exceed the logi-
cal and legal limits of their authority with reference to searches
and seizures, and that no presumption as to regularity of conduct
be made so as to excuse the officer where guilt is not proven.
With such legislation in force, it is believed that competency
and pertinency may well become the controlling consideration
for the admissibility of all evidence, however procured. The
innocent will have redress for the violation of their rights and
convictions will surely overtake the guilty.
